4 | Prelude to Chaos- Events 1946-47

Made with NotebookLM

Also Listen in Kannada | Hindi | Marathi

I. The Cabinet Mission Plan and Its Ambiguous Interpretation (May 1946 – Early 1947)

As discussed in the previous article, the Cabinet Mission in 1946 brought definitive proposals that directly addressed the future of the Indian States, most notably the concept of the lapse of paramountcy.  The Cabinet Mission plan was presented as a recommendation but functioned as an "award." The Congress initially agreed to participate in the Constituent Assembly, and the Muslim League also accepted it at first, though reiterating that sovereign Pakistan still remained its ultimate goal. However, after a conflict between the Congress and the League over the interpretation of the plan, Muslim League revoked its acceptance.

Despite the League's revocation, an interim government was formed with Nehru as President (2 September), later joined by League representatives (15 October). Elections to the Constituent Assembly were held, but the elected Muslim Leaguers boycotted it. The Constituent Assembly met on 9 December 1946.

A Negotiating Committee was appointed by the Constituent Assembly (21 December) to meet a similar body from the Chamber of Princes to discuss the States' representation. Nehru regretted that they had to meet the rulers' Negotiating Committee instead of representatives of the people of the States.

II. The Princes' Stance and Demands (January – April 1947)

The Chamber of Princes, after consulting the Political Department, adopted a resolution on 29 January 1947 asserting that accession to the Union could only occur through negotiation, with the final decision left to each State. Participation in constitutional discussions was to imply no commitment. The States insisted that they would retain all subjects and powers not explicitly ceded to the Union, and emphasized the legal and political consequences of paramountcy’s lapse. They demanded that the Union not interfere in their internal constitutions, territorial boundaries, or dynastic successions, except with their free consent. The Constituent Assembly, they maintained, was not authorized to legislate on internal matters concerning the States. The resolution affirmed that only the States’ Negotiating Committee could conduct preliminary talks on behalf of all the princely states.

Despite this united front, cracks soon appeared. The Dewan of Baroda and the Maharajah of Cochin announced their intention to negotiate directly and join the Constituent Assembly. Initial meetings between the two sides—led by the Nawab of Bhopal and key Indian leaders like Nehru and Patel—were marked by significant differences. The Nawab of Bhopal insisted on written assurances before the States would enter the Assembly.

Nehru, in a conciliatory statement on 9 February, reiterated the Congress’s acceptance of the Cabinet Mission Plan, assured the princes that Congress would not interfere with monarchical systems, and affirmed the voluntary nature of the Assembly framework. This softened the atmosphere and led to an agreement on the distribution of seats.

III. Attlee’s Declaration and Its Immediate Impact (February – April 1947)

On 20 February 1947, Prime Minister Clement Attlee announced in Parliament that British rule would end no later than June 1948. Lord Mountbatten would replace Lord Wavell as the last Viceroy. Crucially, Attlee declared that His Majesty’s Government did not intend to transfer its paramountcy obligations to any successor government in India. For the interim period, relations with the princely states would be governed by individual agreements.

This declaration significantly shifted the pace of negotiations. Nehru emphasised a new sense of urgency for the States to join the Constituent Assembly. On 1 March, an agreement was reached on seat distribution, and a subcommittee was established to decide on the selection process, settling that half of the State representatives would be elected. Nehru also invited the States to join existing Constituent Assembly committees, though the Chancellor of the Chamber of Princes deferred the decision, preferring to consult a general conference of rulers.

IV. Shifting Alignments Among Rulers (April 1947)

Internal disagreements soon intensified. The Maharajah of Bikaner, Sir Sadul Singh, publicly rejected the Chancellor’s “wait-and-see” policy. He warned that boycotting the Assembly would make it seem like the States were aligning with divisive elements in British India. He stressed the importance of a strong central government and argued that the interests of the people lay in working with British India.

Patiala’s ruler echoed this position, leading to a compromise resolution on 2 April that expressed willingness to cooperate while insisting that the Constituent Assembly ratify any agreement. Though this was effectively a face-saving device, Nehru saw ratification as unnecessary. Patiala supported Nehru’s position and urged other States to join.

This moment marked the breakdown of the united front among the princes. On 28 April 1947, representatives from Baroda, Bikaner, Cochin, Jaipur, Jodhpur, Patiala, and Rewa took their seats in the Assembly, signaling the disintegration of the Chamber of Princes’ earlier consensus.

As some States contemplated asserting independence, tensions escalated. At a Congress meeting on 13 June, Nehru firmly rejected the idea that any State could declare itself independent. He argued that the Cabinet Mission Plan did not permit such a course and warned that alternate arrangements could not begin with secession.

Jinnah disagreed strongly, asserting that each princely State was sovereign and had the right to remain independent or refuse to join either India or Pakistan. Meanwhile, the Congress demanded the immediate transfer of the functions of the Political Department to the new Government of India. They accused the Department of destroying key records, dismantling residencies, and ceding control over cantonments and British forces to the States.

Lord Mountbatten proposed creating a new “States Department” with Indian and Pakistani sections to handle these issues. Nehru and Jinnah both expressed concern over the unilateral destruction of records, arguing that much of this material was crucial for the successor governments.

V. The Threat of Balkanization and the Lapse of Paramountcy

The threat of India's fragmentation intensified when Travancore (11 June) and Hyderabad (12 June) both declared their intention to become independent sovereign States. This caused alarm among Indian leaders, who feared a wave of similar declarations.

On 14 June, the All-India Congress Committee passed a strongly worded resolution rejecting the idea that paramountcy’s lapse gave States the right to secede. They insisted that the existing obligations and rights between the Government of India and the States remained valid and refused to acknowledge the legitimacy of any State’s claim to independence.

Jinnah countered this on 18 June, affirming that with paramountcy’s lapse, the States would become fully sovereign and free to choose their path. Mountbatten, however, clearly stated at a press conference that His Majesty’s Government would not confer dominion status on any State that claimed independence.

Some rulers explored forming regional federations, but Gandhi and Nehru opposed these moves, seeing them as attempts by the Political Department to obstruct democratic reform within the States.

In Menon’s view, the prospect of States returning to complete political isolation posed the gravest threat to India’s integrity. The fear of Balkanization—of a disunited subcontinent fragmenting into dozens of sovereign monarchies—haunted this decisive phase of the freedom struggle.

Congress leaders, particularly Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel and Jawaharlal Nehru, adopted a firm policy against the states' independence. Nehru warned that states refusing to join the Constituent Assembly would be viewed as hostile. Most states were geographically contiguous with either India or Pakistan, making an independent existence impractical, as Lord Mountbatten noted in his address to the Chamber of Princes on 25 July 1947.

The princes often lacked popular support, with their people increasingly demanding democratic governance. By June 3rd, 1947, the rulers were in a precarious position—legally independent but practically vulnerable, facing pressure from Indian leadership and without British protection.

The immediate aftermath of Partition, with widespread communal violence and a massive refugee crisis, created an urgent need for political stability and unity, accelerating the process of integration.

Reference:

• Government of India. (1950). White Paper on Indian States.

• Menon, V. P. (1956). The Story of Integration of Indian States. Orient Blackswan (Reprint)

• Menon, V. P. (1957). The Transfer of Power in India. Princeton University Press.