3 | Indian States: War time developments to Cabinet Mission Plan- (1939-1946)

Dominion Status and Post-War Consultations (1939): Lord Linlithgow, the Viceroy, reiterated the British government's policy of Dominion Status as the "natural issue of India's progress." He proposed post-war consultations with various Indian communities, parties, interests, and rulers to modify the 1935 Government of India Act. A consultative group was also suggested to aid in the war effort.

 Rejection by Major Parties and Rulers' Demands: Both the Congress and the Muslim League rejected Linlithgow's offer. Congress ministries in seven provinces resigned. The Chamber of Princes, while pledging support for the war, demanded the preservation of their autonomy and the protection of their rights in any future constitution of India. They also insisted that "no commitment affecting their rights or interests should be made without their consent".

Emergence of the "Two-Nation" Theory (1940): A critical development was Jinnah's declaration in January 1940 that "the Hindus and the Muslims formed two separate nations." Three months later, at the Lahore session of the Muslim League, he explicitly called for "a separate independent State of Pakistan," which became a dominant factor in subsequent constitutional discussions.

The August Offer (1940): As the war intensified, Lord Linlithgow offered to increase Indian representation in the Governor-General's Executive Council and establish a War Advisory Council including States' representatives. A body "representative of the 'principal elements in India's national life'" would draft a new constitution post-war, with the caveat that Britain would not "transfer their present responsibilities… to any system of government whose authority is directly denied by large and powerful elements." This offer was rejected by both the Congress and the Muslim League. Despite the rejections, Indian representation in the Executive Council increased from three to eight in July 1941 (Menon, 1956, pp. 5–7).

Impact of WWII on India (1941-42): Japan's entry into the war in December 1941 and rapid advances, including the fall of Singapore (February 1942) and Rangoon (March 1942), brought India directly into the war zone, increasing pressure for a political resolution (Menon, 1956, pp. 7–8).

Churchill's Declaration and Cripps' Proposals (March 1942): Churchill announced Sir Stafford Cripps' mission to "rally all the forces of Indian life to guard their land from the menace of the invader". Cripps' offer was "to be accepted as a whole or rejected as a whole".

         Long-term Plan: A constitution-making body would be set up post-war to frame a new Indian Union with "full status of a Dominion with the power to secede... from the British Commonwealth." The plan allowed provinces that were unwilling to adopt the new constitution to draft their own through a similar procedure.

         States' Role and Concerns: The Cripps declaration stated that "whether or not an individual State (Princely states) elects to adhere to the constitution, it will be necessary to negotiate a revision of its treaty arrangements." States were to appoint representatives to the constitution-making body in proportion to their population.

         Paramountcy: Cripps clarified that the British Government does not intend to transfer paramountcy to any party. Paramountcy would end for States joining the Union but continue for others.

         Right to Form Separate Unions: Rulers of princely states  raised the question of whether non-adhering States could form a Union of their own with full sovereign status. Cripps indicated that "personally he did not see any fundamental difficulty" but could not give a definite reply.

         Advice for Rulers: Cripps advised rulers to establish contact with the major political parties in British India and for smaller States to form federation among themselves.

         Rejection and Rulers' Relief: Both the Congress and the Muslim League rejected the Cripps offer. The rulers, having closely watched these reactions, "heaved an almost audible sigh of relief," with one Prime Minister noting, "Personally I feel that we escaped one very narrowly".

British Assurances and Caveats (January 1943): In response to the Chamber of Princes' demands, the Political Department assured rulers that "the fulfillment of the fundamental obligations... arising out of their treaties and sanads remained an integral part of the policy of His Majesty's Government."

The Crown's obligations included: (a) protection of their territories against external aggression; (b) protection of their dynasties against internal disruption and (c) protection of certain rights of a primarily economic character

         Rejection of a Separate States' Union: The idea of non-acceding States forming their own Union, though initially considered by the Secretary of State, was ultimately rejected by Lord Linlithgow as "just not practical politics" and "not worth wasting time considering it".

         Obstacles to Federation: Lack of sufficient economic resources, poorly trained officials incapable of administering federal law, and vulnerability to political agitation from British India were few of the major problems facing the small states.

         Proposed Solutions: The Secretary of State suggested replacing individual rulers' jurisdiction with a single administration of the Viceroy for smaller States, with their destiny likely being merging with British India. Lord Linlithgow preferred administrative absorption into larger neighboring States or the combination of smaller units for administrative purposes.

The Attachment Scheme (1943): This scheme, a result of these discussions, attached certain semi-jurisdictional States in Kathiawar and Gujarat to the neighboring States, covering a substantial area and population.

The Nawab of Bhopal as Chancellor: Upon his election (1944), the Nawab of Bhopal "infused new life into the Chamber and forged that body into an effective instrument for developing the rulers into a 'Third Force' in Indian politics." He aimed for a structure with a loose centre with residuary powers in the States. He believed this would give the States to a key position and hold the balance against a divided Congress and Muslim League.

Demand Against Transfer of Relationship (November 1944): The Nawab moved a resolution asserting that "the Crown's relationship with the States and the Crown's power in respect of the States cannot and should not be transferred to any third party or other authority without the consent of the States concerned" (Menon, 1956, p. 313).

Viceroy Wavell's Response and Assurance (June 1945): Lord Wavell initially disallowed the resolution but later, anxious to placate the rulers, gave an assurance that "there would be no future transference of relationship of the States with the Crown to any other authority without their consent”. The Standing Committee withdrew their resignation in response.

Wavell's Second Plan (September 1945): Following a Labour government coming to power in Britain, Lord Wavell announced a new plan for convening a constitution-making body. It stated: "Discussions will be undertaken with the representatives of the Indian States with a view to ascertain in what way they can best take their part in the constitution-making body”.

Controversy over States' Representation: This announcement immediately raised the question of who would represent the States. The Congress argued that only popular representatives who had been elected on a wide franchise could represent them, while some rulers asserted their right to "hold" the power they had.

Attlee's Stance (March 1946): Prime Minister Attlee, addressing Parliament, expressed hope that the statesmen of British India and of Princely India will be able to work out a solution of the problem of bringing together the disparate constituent parts.

States’ views to the Mission and Reactions:

The Nawab of Bhopal emphasized the desire for maximum degree of sovereignty. He favored a ‘loose federation’ and pleaded to not transfer the paramountcy to the Indian Government. He also suggested that if two States (India, Pakistan) were to exist, a "third India composed of the States should not be recognized".

Broadly, the states sought the lapse of paramountcy, freedom from forced accession, the right to form a confederation, and non-interference in internal affairs. Many small states (eg. Durgapur, as well as states like Travancore) advocated for grouping of states into a larger unit. Large state like Hyderabad emphasiszed its demand for independent state and "retrocession of the territories ceded to the East India Company" along with "free outlet to the sea" (Goa). While there were rulers like Sir Mirza Ismail of Jaipur who prioritized resolving Congress-League differences and preserving the ruling dynasties, which he considered embodiment of traditional Indian culture & civilization.

Sir Conrad Corfield's Advice (June 1946): The Political Adviser, Sir Conrad Corfield, advised the rulers that the lapse of paramountcy gave them "the best bargaining position possible." He urged them to form a Negotiating Committee with a clear brief, including conditions such as the method of selecting representatives, exclusion of dynastic questions, and ratification by individual States. He also promised the Political Department’s assistance during the interim period and encouraged rulers to maintain continuous personal touch with their subjects.

Resolution of the Chamber of Princes (June 10, 1946): The Standing Committee accepted the Cabinet Mission plan as providing "the necessary machinery for the attainment by India of independence, as well as a fair basis for further negotiations." They welcomed the declaration on paramountcy but noted the need for "adjustments for the interim period" and sought clarification on matters of fundamental importance that have been left to negotiate. A Negotiating Committee was established to engage with the British Indian Constituent Assembly.