2 | The paramountcy of the British crown

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The concept of paramountcy developed as the British consolidated their power in India, particularly after the decline of the Mughal and Maratha empires. Governor-General Wellesley was a key figure in working toward making the British the paramount power in the subcontinent. Initially, the British pursued a policy of annexation; however, after the 1857 rebellion, the approach shifted to recognizing princely states as separate entities. The term paramount began to be used in the 1810s, and by the 1820s, the full doctrine of paramountcy was being articulated (Ramusack, 2004).

Paramountcy evolved under British rule and was not solely based on treaties but also on usage, sufferance, and decisions embodied in political practice. It was considered a pillar of 'indirect rule' in the princely states, yet remained perpetually undefined. The British maintained that their supremacy existed independently of treaties. The Butler Committee refused to define it, stating that “Paramountcy must remain paramount; it must fulfil its obligations, defining or adapting itself according to the shifting necessities of the time and the progressive development of the States” (White Paper on Indian States, 1950, as cited in Ramusack, 2004).

The full doctrine of paramountcy was evolved by figures like Charles Metcalfe and David Ochterlony in the early 19th century. Metcalfe, in 1825, stated that the British had "by degrees become the paramount State of India" and that their duty was to maintain the succession legitimacy of the princes, while abstaining from further internal interference. However, this caution was increasingly disregarded for British interests (Ramusack, 2004).

The British assumed sovereign power superior to that of the princes, often in the name of good governance. The undefined nature of paramountcy allowed them to justify intervention in the internal affairs of princely states when deemed expedient for British interests. The sovereignty of princely states was based more on status than territoriality and thus was treated as detrimental to a contiguous national community. The states had no international status; the paramount power had exclusive authority over foreign affairs, and paramountcy extended to almost all aspects of state life and even the personal lives of rulers (Ramusack, 2004).

The paramountcy, under the subsidiary alliance system introduced by Lord Wellesley, guaranteed the ruler's position against external threats and internal uprisings. This unfortunately often enabled rulers to exercise power without responsibility. The princes did not bother about the ‘consequences of misrule’ and became indolent, cruel and avaricious. They no longer felt the need to cultivate public goodwill and maintain good governance, making the states administratively inefficient. It led to political stagnation and economic decline in many states, while serving the British imperial interests. This system essentially operated on the theory that the “Government is not for the people but the people for the King" (White Paper, 1950).

Paramountcy also led to economic restrictions on the states. Treaties often extracted resources in the form of subsidies or tribute, and the British influenced financial dealings, including salt and opium revenues and infrastructure like railways and telegraphs. They also claimed judicial authority over European subjects and cantonments within princely states. A formal hierarchy was established through the “Salute Table,” reinforcing the idea of princes as vassals to the Crown (Ramusack, 2004).

While paramountcy allowed the British to use princes as inexpensive administrators and allies, it also shielded princely states from internal political aspirations and external pressures, thereby delaying democratic participation.

The Maharaja of Patiala famously dispelled the "common mistake" that states owed their existence to British power, asserting that most existed long before the British arrived. He noted that states sought British protection to exchange a heavy tribute from the Marathas, preferring British supremacy.

In 1947, the British government declared that paramountcy would automatically lapse with the transfer of power. The Indian Independence Act, 1947, formally released the states from all obligations to the Crown. The Cabinet Mission’s Memorandum on States’ Treaties and Paramountcy (May 12, 1946) affirmed that the Crown would cease to exercise powers of paramountcy.

V. P. Menon, Secretary of the States Department, called the lapse of paramountcy a “blessing in disguise,” arguing it allowed the new Indian government to begin with a “clean slate” unencumbered by old treaties (Menon, 1957). However, it also removed the British obligation to protect princes from internal unrest. Though the British encouraged states to remain independent or sign treaties with the new Dominions of India or Pakistan, this was fiercely resisted by Indian leaders who feared Balkanization.

However, statesmen like B. R. Ambedkar critiqued the Cabinet Mission’s view on non-transferability of paramountcy as ‘mischievous’ and argued it was a prerogative of the Crown. Citing International Law, he contended that paramountcy could not simply be abandoned by the Crown without explicit statutory authority, and that independent India had a valid claim to inherit it, as it was built and conserved by the Indian Army paid for by British India (Moon, 1979). Adding to this criticism, Jawaharlal Nehru also argued that paramountcy cannot lapse due to geographical, historical and defence reasons, asserting that states cannot live in void and must come to terms with the Indian Union (Phadnis, 1968).

After Cabinet Mission’s announcement of lapse of paramountcy, the Indian government, led by Sardar Patel and guided by Menon, initiated integration through negotiation, persuasion, and force when needed. Initially, princes signed Instruments of Accession, giving up control over defence, foreign affairs, and communication. But soon, they signed Merger Agreements or Covenants (large states) transferring full governance to the Indian Union (Zubrzycki, 2023; Menon, 1957).

Although independent India did not inherit paramountcy de jure, it assumed the role de facto, legitimized by democratic authority. The vacuum left by its lapse was filled through a federal relationship with the new government. Article 371 placed former princely states under the general control of the President of India.

In 1971, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi re-invoked the concept of paramountcy during the abolition of privy purses. When former princes challenged the move, the state argued that “rulership” was a gift of the President, not a right. Thus, the Indian state reproduced the colonial ambiguity of paramountcy, this time to justify democratic consolidation (Dhabhai, 2018).

References 

● Dhabhai, N. (2018). Ambivalent Kinship: Indian Princes and the Making of the Postcolonial State.

● Menon, V. P. (1957). The Transfer of Power in India. Princeton University Press.

● Moon, V. (ed.) (1979). Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar Writings And Speeches, Volume 12, Government of Maharashtra.

● Phadnis, U. (1968). Towards the Integration of Indian States, 1919-1947. Asia Publishing House.

● Ramusack, B. N. (2004). The Indian Princes and their States. Cambridge University Press.

● Zubrzycki, J. (2023). Dethroned: Sardar Patel and the Integration of Princely India. Hurst & Company.

● Government of India. (1950). White Paper on Indian States.