7c | People of Integration

Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel was a towering figure in the Indian National Congress, second only after Jawaharlal Nehru. Patel was often called the ‘Bismarck of India’ for the role he played in unifying scattered princely states into a cohesive nation. Born in 1875 in the city of Nadiad in Gujarat, his birthdate was however never officially recorded. He studied law and became a pleader in criminal cases and later a barrister. After joining the Congress, he transformed it from ‘english-knowing, upper class affair’ into a mass, grassroot movement. He became the first President of the Gujarat Provincial Congress Committee in 1920, a position he held until 1946.

He gained prominence and the title "Sardar" (chief) after successfully leading the Bardoli satyagraha in 1928, a non-violent peasant movement against government taxes. He believed that for India to achieve Swaraj (self-rule), "The red and yellow colours on India’s map have to be made one," referring to the distinction between princely and British India. His approach throughout his rise was that states must introduce responsible government and guarantee fundamental rights to their subjects, viewing a ruler merely as a trustee. Patel was instrumental in the Congress's decision to accept the partition of India and Dominion Status, viewing it as the only way to achieve a swift and peaceful transfer of power and avoid civil war. Mountbatten thought of him as a pragmatic and realistic politician, “refreshingly free of the complexities of Nehru and Gandhi”.

On 27 June 1947, the States Department was set up, with Sardar Patel as its head as the Minister of States. This appointment was a relief to Mountbatten, who saw Patel as having a less abrasive approach to the rulers, compared to Nehru. Patel immediately appointed V.P. Menon as the Secretary of the States Department, despite Nehru's preference for H.V.R. Iyengar. This marked the beginning of their decisive collaboration. Menon described their relationship as one where Patel treated him as an equal. Patel’s powerful personality, a mix of both charm and fury, complemented Menon’s skills as a tactician and a draftsman. They both used persuasion and coercion in their negotiations with the rulers. On 5 July 1947, Patel issued a policy statement, drafted by Menon, appealing to the princes to accede. He emphasized on the common interests and shared heritage, while subtly warning that choosing the alternative to co-operation in the general interest is ‘anarchy and chaos’.

Conroy Cornfield, the viceroy’s advisor on princely states, resigned shortly before the States Department was formed. Cornfield was accused of encouraging princely states to declare independence. Patel had a clash with Cornfield over the Nizam of Hyderabad’s attempt to absorb the Bastar region. Patel insisted that he would not allow the interests of the people (of Bastar) to be “bartered away” like that. Many states from Travancore to Kashmir, dreamed of independence. Patel urged states that had joined the Constituent Assembly to accede immediately, stating it would give them a stronger position in government policy. The smaller states were mostly poor and poorly administered. Patel and Menon persuaded their rulers to merge with adjoining provinces, often using the threat of popular uprisings or direct intervention if they refused. One of the first states to do so were Orissa and Chhattisgarh states, setting the precedent for future mergers.

In the Kathiawar region of Gujarat, many small states and estates were spread like patch-work and many of its rulers had good relations with Congress. Menon advised them to form a union with an elected legislative assembly. Patel supported this unification, calling it “little pools of water which are stagnant and useless, joining to form a big lake’. In Madhya Bharat too he insisted on a single union, despite Indore and Gwalior’s rivalries, and warned that he would not tolerate any opposition. After the integration of Rajputana states into Greater Rajasthan, he survived a near fatal plane crash, while travelling to the inauguration ceremony in Jaipur.

In the three big cases of Junagarh, Kashmir and Hyderabad Patel played a crucial role. After Independence, Junagarh announced accession to Pakistan without any official communication with the Indian government. Patel moved quickly after Pakistan accepted it, as he was determined to not let it go to Pakistan. Initially, Patel sent Menon to Junagarh but found the Nawab elusive. Failure of negotiations led him to deploy troops at Junagarh’s borders. The Nawab fled to Pakistan and his Diwan, Shah Nawaz Bhutto requested India to take over administration. On 13 November 1947 triumphant Patel visited Junagarh and addressed the crowd of 50000 people who favoured accession to India. After a referendum with overwhelming support for India, Junagarh was integrated into the Saurashtra Union. Patel’s interest in Kashmir intensified after Pakistan’s move on Junagarh. Although he was handling Kashmir affairs initially, Nehru took it over, bringing in N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar. However, Patel openly disagreed on the decision to take the issue to the UN, famously calling it an ‘insecurity council’.

Hyderabad was the largest princely state in India, which Patel saw as the ‘dagger into the heart of India’ if it remained independent. After the initial negotiations failed and the Nizam violated the Standstill Agreement, along with the intensifying unrest in the state caused by Razakars and communist uprising, he persuaded the Cabinet to prepare for military action. Despite Nehru’s warning about impact on Kashmir, Patel asserted that Hyderabad’s duplicity was sufficient justification for a firm and definite action. In September 1948, Indian forces intervened through Operation Polo and took over Hyderabad. Patel reframed it as ‘Police Action’, emphasising that it was to address the deteriorating communal law and order situation. During his first visit to Hyderabad after this intervention in February 1949, Patel was frank with the Nizam, confronting him about the Razakars and his past actions. The Nizam pleaded for forgiveness and pledged loyalty to the Indian Union. Patel viewed the Nizam's surrender as the culmination of India's unification.

Sardar Patel, with the help of Menon, achieved the astonishing feat of unifying India in just two years, creating a politically cohesive nation stripped of autocracy and extending responsible, democratically elected government to the people of the states. He believed in compensating the rulers for giving up their sovereignty, in the form of Privy purses. He considered it a ‘small price to pay for the bloodless revolution’ and often clashed with Nehru in protecting these payments, who was reluctant to spend public money on them.

Despite his weakening health in the later years, he continued to exert significant influence in the government. He also served as an Acting Prime Minister four times. Patel died on 15 December 1950. His death was a significant blow for V. P. Menon, with whom he had shared a close bond. Menon fulfilled his promise to Patel by writing two books – The Transfer of Power in India and The Story of Integration of Indian States.

Vappala Pangunni (V.P.) Menon was a pivotal figure in the birth of independent India. His dedication and ingenuity were crucial in integrating the princely states into the Indian Union.

Born in 1893 in a small town of Ottapalam in Kerala, Menon was a prodigious learner, mastering multiple languages and mathematics. He started his government service as a coolie in the Kolar Gold Fields, then became a clerk, and rose through the ranks to become the Reforms Commissioner, holding the highest position in the government ever held by an Indian. His experiences as a civil servant, including encounters with the lavish lifestyles of maharajas and the administrative chaos caused by numerous small states with their own customs posts, shaped his view to put a stop to their ‘nonsense’. He was known for his bluntness and excellent draftsmanship (Basu, 2020).

Menon served as constitutional adviser to three viceroys: Lord Linlithgow, Lord Wavell, and Lord Mountbatten. In 1940, he became under-secretary in the Reforms Commission for Viceroy Lord Linlithgow, where he found a friend and mentor in H. V. Hodson. By September 1946, Menon was appointed Patel's political aide in the home ministry, beginning a close professional and personal relationship. Menon believed the Cabinet Mission's 1946 proposal for a three-tiered government was ‘unwieldy and difficult to work’. He personally felt that Partition was preferable to civil war and advocated for power to be handed over to two separate central governments, India and Pakistan. He particularly objected to the Mission's plan that allowed successor states to conclude independent treaties with the Crown, viewing it as an invitation for major states to retain independence (Basu, 2020).

On 5 July 1947, he was appointed as the Secretary of the newly formed States department under Sardar Patel. Menon's most significant contribution was his work with Sardar Patel in integrating the hundreds of princely states into the new Indian Union. Menon's approach to the princes combined persuasion, charm, and coercion, including a judicious mix of arm-twisting and veiled threats. He sought to make Lord Mountbatten the ‘ambassador’ of the accession plan, flattering him and appealing to his royal status and influence with the rulers (Menon, 1956).

In his first meeting with the Maharaja of Patiala, Yadavindra Singh, Menon bluntly stated, "independent of us, you cannot exist". For Sir C.P. Ramaswami Aiyar, the dewan of Travancore, Menon employed a different tactic, appealing to his intelligence and pride in his state, highlighting the strategic advantages of accession and warning of anarchy if they remained independent. The hot-headed Maharaja Hanwant Singh of Jodhpur was swayed by Jinnah's blank cheque offer to join Pakistan. Menon counter-offered concessions and reminded him of geographical compulsions and potential communal violence. In the state of Rewa, faced with the young ruler's intransigence, Menon threatened to release his deposed and jailed father to take over the state, compelling the ruler to sign the merger agreement. In the patchwork of territories in Kathiawar, Menon proposed forming the Union of 222 states and drafted a plan that was also approved by Mahatma Gandhi. In the Madhya Bharat, Gwalior and Indore were two crucial and rival states. Menon used a mix of guarantees for privy purses and properties, coupled with Patel's stern intervention, to secure their merger into the Madhya Bharat union (Menon, 1956).

Menon's overall strategy was to secure accession on defence, external affairs, and communications, while temporarily allowing rulers to maintain internal autonomy, as a ‘stopgap’ measure. This eventually evolved into full integration, driven by the belief that many small states were not viable and needed to democratise and provide efficient administration (Menon, 1956).

Relation with other key figures:

Menon was Patel's "right hand" and most trusted aide in the States Department. Their relationship was built on mutual respect and shared pragmatism. Menon drafted key documents and advised Patel on strategy, including convincing him on Partition. Patel defended Menon's aggressive tactics in integration, and Menon consistently praised Patel's "masterly" handling of the princes. Despite initially sidelining Menon, Mountbatten quickly came to rely on him as a crucial link to Patel. Menon skillfully persuaded Mountbatten to embrace the revised accession plan, knowing his royal status and personal friendship with many of the princes would be invaluable. When Mountbatten presented his initial proposal known as Plan Balkan to Nehru, he vehemently rejected it. During a critical meeting in Simla, Menon presented his plan to Mountbatten, modifying it based on discussions with Nehru. He convinced Mountbatten that partition was now inevitable and the only way to secure an early transfer of power. Menon worked under immense pressure, with only a few hours to draft the comprehensive blueprint for the transfer of power to India and Pakistan. It came to be known as the ‘Menon Plan’. However, Sardar Patel and Menon were aware of Mountbatten’s desire to take the credit. They strategically pandered to it believing that Mountbatten's prestige and influence were vital in selling the plan, especially to the princely states. Mountbatten presented it on June 3rd, 1947 to the Indian leaders as his own plan, crediting Menon for his assistance. Nehru initially had reservations about Menon's plans, but ultimately approved them. Nehru admired Menon's administrative talents but their relationship became strained, especially after Patel's death, leading to Menon being sidelined from key government positions (Basu, 2020).

Menon's tireless efforts, alongside Patel and Mountbatten, led to the accession of almost all of the princely states within a matter of weeks, adding significant territory and population to the new Dominion. After his retirement, Menon fulfilled a promise to Patel by writing two seminal books, "The Transfer of Power in India" and "The Story of the Integration of the Indian States," which provide invaluable insights into the events of the time. In later years he briefly served as the Governor of Orissa, resigning within a short period. He joined Swatantra party as a founding member, but never contested in elections. He passed away in 1964 with his contributions often overshadowed by other political giants, yet his work fundamentally shaped modern India (Basu, 2020).

Louis Francis Albert Victor Nicholas Mountbatten, popularly known as Lord Mountbatten was a British statesman, 1st Earl of Burma and last viceroy of British India. He was born on 25 June 1900 in Berkshire, completed his education in Royal Naval College and served in the Royal Navy during first and second world wars. He was also King George VI’s cousin and an astute wartime commander.

He was appointed as the last viceroy of India in February 1947 by labour Prime Minister Clement Atlee. Attlee chose him for his persuasive abilities. Mountbatten was granted unprecedented plenipotentiary powers, allowing him to make decisions without London's approval. His directive was to achieve a unitary government for British India and the Indian States, ideally within the British Commonwealth. His mission was complicated by previous failed attempts to address the princes' demands. King George VI urged Mountbatten to ensure fair play for the Princes, although he admitted that he had no prior idea about the difficulty of the problem of princely states.

Mountbatten arrived in Delhi on 22 March 1947, taking charge two days later. He aimed for a smooth and speedy transfer of power by June 1948. Mountbatten had a meticulous, business-like approach, dictating summaries of his meetings and holding daily staff conferences to monitor events. He was a pragmatist and a realist, who initially focused on solving British India's problems rather than the princely states. Due to his royal status he was on excellent terms with most of the rulers. However, for the same reason he was also described by them as a ‘herdsman’ leading the princes to the ‘abattoir’ (slaughterhouse).

He presented the Plan Balkan regarding the future of Princely states to Nehru, which involved the demission of authority directly to provinces or confederations of provinces. Nehru vehemently opposed it, citing it would fragment India. V.P. Menon, then Reforms Commissioner and constitutional adviser, played a pivotal role in drafting a new plan for accession and in convincing Mountbatten to adopt it as his own. Nehru accepted this revised plan. Mountbatten developed an excellent rapport with Nehru, whom he found very charming and possessing an English sense of humour. Though his initial impression of Sardar Patel was little apprehensive, a mutual sentiment, they both grew to respect each other as pragmatist and realist. With Mahatma Gandhi, he sought goodwill, who in turn urged Mountbatten to prevent the Balkanization of India. Gandhi publicly stated that Mountbatten had no hand in the inevitability of partition, attributing it to Hindu-Muslim disagreement. He had a difficult relationship with Jinnah due to his unresponsiveness to United India and Jinnah’s efforts to encourage rulers to join Pakistan or remain independent.

As Mountbatten was initially focused on resolving the issues in British India, he admitted that he had not fully understood the scope of the problem on princely states before July 1947. He had believed that the lapse of paramountcy, which had bound the princely states to the British Crown, would simplify matters, as the states would become fully independent and could decide their own future. However, the Congress leadership viewed the idea of states standing out as independent entities as dangerous to the unity of India. With the lapse of paramountcy and numerous states expressing desire to stay independent, coupled with the accelerated timeline for transfer of power created immense urgency. So, Mountbatten's strategy quickly evolved to prevent the further fragmentation of the subcontinent.

He supported and became the chief advocate for V.P. Menon's plan for states to accede to either India or Pakistan on the three core subjects of defence, external affairs, and communications. He also believed that India and Pakistan remaining within the Commonwealth would facilitate integration and stability. Mountbatten helped secure India's continued membership in the Commonwealth even as a republic, a concept Nehru initially found uncomfortable but later accepted, acknowledging Mountbatten's ‘presence and activities’ for easing past resentments. Sardar Patel on the other hand wholeheartedly agreed to Mountbatten's involvement in negotiating with the rulers. Mountbatten, in turn, gave Patel considerable flexibility in handling Hyderabad, on the condition that Pakistan was not involved. At crucial receptions for rulers, Mountbatten would speak to them and then ‘pass them on’ to Menon, who would then direct them to Patel, creating a powerful psychological effect.

On 25 July 1947, Mountbatten, in his capacity as the Crown Representative, delivered a pivotal address to the Chamber of Princes in New Delhi. This was the first and last time he addressed them in that role. His goal was to persuade the rulers of the princely states to accede to either to the Dominion of India or Pakistan before the transfer of power on 15 August 1947. Although he stated that the lapse of paramountcy granted states ‘freedom’ to negotiate their future, he pointed out the ‘geographical compulsions’ that linked the vast majority of the 565 states to the Dominion of India. He spoke extempore, without notes, showcasing his oratorical skill. He skillfully employed a combination of ‘fearful prophecies’ and humour to sway the audience.

Mountbatten warned the rulers of the dangers of isolation, stating, "You cannot run away from the Dominion Government which is your neighbour any more than you can run away from the subjects for whose welfare you are responsible" (White Paper, 1950). Following the address and intensive lobbying, almost all states had signed the Instrument of Accession and Standstill Agreement within three weeks. In this process, he also leveraged his status as cousin to the King-Emperor and his existing friendships with several rulers, who saw him as a ‘friend who was trying to help’, some affectionately calling him ‘Dickie’.

As a personal friend of Mountbatten, the Nawab of Bhopal, a key opponent of accession, received considerable attention from the Viceroy. Mountbatten worked hard to persuade him, even offering to keep his signed Instrument of Accession secret for ten days after independence to save his face. This personal touch ultimately secured Bhopal's accession. When Jinnah offered Hanwant Singh (Maharajah of Jodhpur) concessions for acceding to Pakistan, Mountbatten intervened to warn him about the severe communal consequences, given Jodhpur's Hindu majority. Later, after signing the Instrument of Accession, Hanwant Singh raised a pistol at V. P. Menon, at which point Mountbatten quickly stepped in to calm the situation. The three of them later laughed about it.

The Diwan of Travancore, Sir C.P. Ramasawami Aiyar initially insisted on independence or a looser agreement rather than full accession. Mountbatten engaged with him personally, highlighting the ‘golden opportunity’ for Travancore to play a significant role in India. This, along with Menon's persuasive arguments, ultimately led to Travancore's accession. Maharajah of Kashmir, Hari Singh was also an old friend of Mountbatten. He visited him personally to persuade him to accede. However, Hari Singh's indecisiveness and procrastination meant Mountbatten ultimately failed to secure his accession before the transfer of power, leaving Kashmir as an unresolved issue. He also tried to cultivate a relationship with the Nizam of Hyderabad and was optimistic about reaching a negotiated settlement. He even secured extensions for negotiations from the Indian government. Despite his personal efforts and optimism, Mountbatten ultimately failed to get Hyderabad to accede through negotiation, which was later absorbed by force.

By the end of 1949, Mountbatten successfully facilitated the accession of almost all states. He later supported the merger of small, non-viable states into larger administrative units or provinces, even claiming the idea as his own and likening it to Napoleon's mediatization. His actions, even if viewed as biased by some Pakistani leaders, were crucial in shaping the political cohesion of independent India.

Born on 14 November 1889 in Allahabad, Jawaharlal Nehru was the first Prime Minister of independent India. Hailing from Kashmiri brahmin family, he was the son of Motilal Nehru, a leading barrister who also served as the president of the Indian National Congress. Educated by English tutors, he developed a taste for science and anti-imperialism. After studying law in England, he returned to India in 1912 and launched his political career in 1918, becoming secretary of the Home Rule League. He was deeply influenced by Mahatma Gandhi and subsequently spent over nine years in jail for his involvement in the independence movement. These prison years were instrumental in shaping his intellectual life, leading him to write his autobiography and other famous works such as Glimpses of World History, and The Discovery of India.

He consistently championed parliamentary democracy, working to establish it as the governing system for independent India. While he respected Gandhi, Nehru had no sympathy for his religious views, often criticising it, which set him apart from Gandhi. Initially, Nehru was not prepared to contemplate partition during his early discussions with Lord Mountbatten. His long-standing vision was of a whole India, undivided into bits and pieces. He viewed any proposals that invited the creation of multiple successor states as encouraging disruptive tendencies, chaos, and weakness.

Lord Mountbatten arrived in India in March 1947 with the immediate task of executing the transfer of power. V.P. Menon, who served as Constitutional Adviser to the Governor-General, had discussed with Sardar Patel that a united India under the Cabinet Mission plan was an illusion and that division on the basis of Dominion Status was a better path for a peaceful transfer of power. Nehru was resistant to the partition at first, despite his later agreement. 

By April 1947, he publicly stated that the Muslim League could have Pakistan if they wished, "but on the condition that they do not take away other parts of India which do not wish to join Pakistan". In June 1947, Nehru was part of the historic conference with seven leaders, including Sardar Patel and Muslim League representatives, where the partition of the country was decided upon.

When the States Department was formed in June 1947, both Nehru and Muhammad Ali Jinnah agreed on its necessity. Mountbatten preferred Sardar Patel to head it over Nehru, however Rajmohan Gandhi, Patel’s biographer, notes that the decision to let him handle the states was jointly reached by him and Nehru. Nehru was appointed India's first Prime Minister in August 1947.

Nehru held a steadfast opposition to Princely India and Monarchy. He believed that the ‘destruction of the Princes was bound to happen’ and that the future of India meant a unified nation without the fragmentation represented by the princely states. His resolve was shaped by early experiences, such as his imprisonment in the princely states of Nabha (1923) and Faridkot (1946) for defying entry bans. He often ‘talked down’ to the princes and advocated for responsible governments within their states. He even took on Mahatma Gandhi's concept of "trusteeship" for princes, viewing it as an anachronism in the face of the sweeping freedom movement. He firmly believed that the entire geographical entity, including the 565-odd princely states, was sacrosanct and must become ‘One free India, without any compromise’.

Nehru actively pushed for the Indian National Congress to mobilise political opinion within the princely states, advocating for responsible governments. He also declared that any state unwilling to join the Constituent Assembly would be regarded as a "hostile State" and would have to bear the consequences. He vehemently rejected the Plan Balkan - a British proposal put forth by Mountbatten that would have allowed provinces and princely states to independently decide their future and endanger future relations between Britain and India. He argued that previous British proposals had been based on the idea of a united India and that abandoning this would provoke widespread resentment. Nehru asserted that the lapse of paramountcy should not lead to the complete independence of the states. He insisted that the existing administrative arrangements and the Political Department's functions should continue under the new Indian government.

Nehru approved V. P. Menon’s revised proposal that states should accede on three core subjects of defence, external affairs and communication. Kashmir was a particularly sensitive issue for Nehru due to his personal and emotional connection to Kashmir. He sought the rapid accession of Kashmir to the Indian Union, especially with the cooperation of his close friend, Sheikh Abdullah. While he initially expressed willingness to abide by a plebiscite in Junagadh and implied it could apply to Kashmir, he later seemed to consciously or unconsciously avoid one in Kashmir, a decision that has been described as a ‘mystery in Nehru's political life’. He eventually took direct control of India's Kashmir policy, believing that Sardar Patel might mishandle Sheikh Abdullah. However, this period also saw his government imprison Sheikh Abdullah for eleven years, a decision viewed by some as incongruous with Nehru's own ideals. Later, in April 1964, not long before his death, Nehru decided to reconsider his Kashmir policy and ordered Sheikh Abdullah's release.

His involvement in the integration of Hyderabad state was also crucial. Initially, Nehru expressed a desire to avoid military intervention in Hyderabad. He accepted Lord Mountbatten's proposal for a Standstill Agreement with Hyderabad in November 1947, hoping it would ‘purchase communal peace in the South for at least one year.’ However, he was irritated by Hyderabad’s violation of the agreement and its secret arms deal with foreign nations. As the situation in Hyderabad deteriorated Nehru became increasingly firm. He rejected any intermediate stage between authoritarian rule and full responsible government unless it was very brief and clearly aimed at democracy. Although he both publicly and privately expressed a desire to avoid military action, he was caught between frantic urge to do something to restore peace and avoid armed conflict. He however allowed Sardar Patel to make the final decisions. After the military takeover, Nehru, in agreement with Sardar Patel, decided that the Nizam should be allowed to continue as a constitutional head to prevent unsettling the Muslim population.

Although Nehru wasn’t directly involved with the integration of other princely states, as a Prime Minister he inaugurated the Second Rajasthan Union in April 1948, and Madhya Bharat Union in May 1948. He was keen on the idea of a Union of Deccan States, advising rulers to first grant responsible government. His symbolic presence and support were crucial for the integration process. By the time the new Constitution came into force on 26 January 1950, all the states had been geographically integrated into the Indian Dominion. Nehru himself, reflecting in September 1948, confessed that even he, intimately connected with the process, "would have hesitated to say that such rapid changes would take place" in the states. He believed that future historians would consider this period of India as one of the ‘dominant phases’ of India's history.

Kanhaiyalal Maneklal Munshi (K. M. Munshi) was an eminent independence movement activist and politician. Born on December 30, 1887, at Broach in modern day Gujarat state, he hailed from a Brahmin family with a tradition of government service. He was deeply influenced by Aurobindo during his college days. His interest in politics began in 1903,when he attended the Surat Congress in 1909 as a volunteer. He actively joined Dr. Annie Besant’s All-India Home Rule League in Bombay, to spread its message in the city and Gujarat, alongside leaders like Muhammad Jinnah and M. R. Jayakar.

Initially, Munshi was not prepared to follow Mahatma Gandhi, finding him ‘incomprehensible’. However, a turning point came with the Bardoli Satyagraha, which, along with Gandhi's Dandi March in 1930, converted him to Gandhism, leading him to fully commit to the national cause. As a lawyer, Munshi practised for over forty years, becoming proficient in various branches of law, including Hindu law, Jaina canon, and the Bhagavad Gita and the philosophy of monotheism for specific cases. During the "Quit India" movement, he played a crucial role in securing the release of prominent leaders like Jayaprakash Narayan and Purshottam Trikamdas through habeas corpus petitions.

Munshi was a constitutionalist and played a significant role in the events leading to India's independence. He was asked by Nehru to join the Expert Committee in February 1946, which was tasked with framing the constitution for free India. He became one of the most active members of the Constituent Assembly, valued for his knowledge of constitutional law and his commitment to a strong and united India. 

He was the fervent advocate of the Akhanda Hindustan (undivided India) and campaigned ceaselessly against the Muslim League's separatist politics, attempting to persuade both British authorities and Indian leaders of the futility and danger of partition. He held discussions with Jinnah, who, despite their past collaboration in the Home Rule League, had become a ‘prophet of partition’. Munshi noted Jinnah's intransigence, especially his rejection of any division that would worsen inter-community relations. His views often aligned with Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, whom he deeply admired for his pragmatism and organising abilities.

Munshi was acutely aware of the princely states’ problem and had observed princely administrations closely, having been educated in Baroda. He had immense respect for Maharaja Sayajiro Gaekwar. He consistently advised rulers, often in professional capacity, to send their representatives to the Indian Constituent Assembly. He also served as an honorary constitutional adviser to the ruler of Udaipur from 1945 until the formation of the United State of Rajasthan in March 1948. He was instrumental in drafting a covenant for the Samyukta Dakshina Rajya (United Deccan States), a project conceived even before Sardar Patel's integration policy was fully formulated. This covenant aimed to form a single state with a unitary government to take its place as a unit in the future Indian Union. In Junagadh, after its Nawab fled, Munshi prepared the draft of the declaration for the provisional Government set up to dislodge the unwanted ruler. He also suggested the name "Matsya Union" for the union of Alwar, Bharatpur, Dholpur, and Karauli, drawing references from ancient Indian texts. He believed in the importance of a strong Centre to ensure protection from disruption and external aggression, advocating for it in the Constituent Assembly.

Munshi's most challenging and critical role concerning princely states was his appointment as India's Agent-General in Hyderabad in late December 1947. Sardar Patel personally asked him to take on this assignment under the Standstill Agreement, despite Munshi's reluctance to leave the Constituent Assembly. Munshi's mission was to ensure the "honest and full implementation of the Standstill Agreement".  However, he found his position difficult as the Nizam, Mir Usman Ali Khan, and his extremist supporters, particularly the Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen and its Razakar militia led by Kasim Razvi, were determined to ignore the agreement. Munshi was effectively isolated and became a ‘prisoner in his own house’ due to the Hyderabad government's suspicion and hostility. His interactions with the Nizam were unproductive, as the ruler avoided discussing the issue. The Hyderabad Premier, Mir Laik Ali, a former client of Munshi's, also aimed for an enlargement of the Standstill Agreement rather than its fulfilment, putting ‘one foot in Hyderabad and another in Pakistan’.

Munshi's reports from Hyderabad constantly highlighted the escalating Razakar violence and Nizam's refusal to implement responsible government, despite assurances from Lord Mountbatten and Nehru. Following the breakdown of negotiations and the continued Razakar menace, the Indian Government initiated the ‘Police Action’. After Hyderabad's defences crumbled, Munshi was summoned by the Nizam and announced his government's resignation, ordered a cease-fire, and allowed Indian troops to enter. Munshi then made a broadcast to the people of Hyderabad, assuring them that India was a secular state and their rights would be protected. Sardar Patel highly praised Munshi's performance in Hyderabad, acknowledging his ‘devotion to duty’ under severe disadvantages.

After independence, he became the Union Minister of Food and Agriculture (1950-1952), focusing on achieving self-sufficiency in food and fibre, promoting irrigation, and developing animal husbandry. Later, he served as the Governor of Uttar Pradesh (1952-1957), where he revitalised universities and promoted Sanskrit learning. 

Munshi withdrew from the Congress in 1959, two years after his tenure as Governor of Uttar Pradesh. He founded the Swatantra Party on June 4, 1959 in Madras with C. Rajagopalachari. The party was established to provide a liberal alternative to the ruling Congress. Munshi could not contribute much to the party's growth and durability as he was not a man of the masses. The party's influence declined, and it ceased to be a force to be reckoned with after the 1967 elections. Munshi's death in February 1971 synchronized with the demise of the party he had helped to found.