20 | Jammu and Kashmir State

Up to the 14th century, Kashmir was ruled by a succession of Buddhist and Hindu dynasties, whose history is recorded in the Sanskrit chronicle, the Rajatarangini. For approximately two centuries, Kashmir served as a summer residence for Mughal emperors. Jammu, during the latter half of the 18th century, was ruled by Ranjit Deo, a Dogra chief of Rajput descent. Three great-grand nephews of Ranjit Deo – Gulab Singh, Dhyan Singh, and Suchet Singh – served Maharaja Ranjit Singh with distinction. In 1818, Ranjit Singh conferred the principality of Jammu upon Gulab Singh, along with the hereditary title of Rajah. The Treaty of Amritsar in 1846 marked the beginning of Jammu and Kashmir as a unified political entity. Under this treaty, Gulab Singh was granted possession of all the hill country between the Indus and Ravi rivers, including Kashmir, Jammu, Ladakh, and Gilgit, as Maharaja. Political relations between the British Government of India and the state began in 1849, conducted through the Punjab Government via the Maharaja's agent at Lahore (Memoranda on the Indian States, 1935; Menon, 1956).

At the time of partition, the state had significant international borders with Tibet to the east, China's Sinkiang province to the north-east, and Afghanistan to the north-west, with a tongue of Afghan territory (Wakhan) located north of Gilgit. Historically, Jammu and Kashmir had a Muslim majority population, though this ratio was somewhat affected in Jammu after partition due to migration. Its ruler Maharajah Hari Singh was hostile to the Indian National Congress due to Nehru's friendship with Sheikh Abdullah but also had no desire to join a self-professed Islamic State like Pakistan. He entertained the idea of an 'Independent Jammu and Kashmir' and was hesitant to accede to either dominion (Menon, 1956; Zubrzycki, 2023).

Grievances existed as early as 1931, stemming from interference by the Ahrar party in Punjab, leading Muslim leaders associated with the Congress to sever ties. Movements for responsible government, such as Sheikh Abdullah's 'Quit Kashmir' movement against monarchical rule, were also significant. The Praja Parishad Movement in Jammu advocated for the state's complete merger with the Union and the repeal of Article 370. Pakistan-supported tribal militias invaded Jammu and Kashmir, although Pakistan denied its involvement. Jinnah accused India of securing accession through violence, while Pakistan claimed the accession was based on "fraud and violence" (Lumby, 1981; Menon, 1956; Ramusack & Johnson, 2004).

Pandit Ramchandra Kak, Jammu and Kashmir's Prime Minister, was invited to an accession conference but did not attend and gave evasive replies about the Maharaja's stance. Lord Mountbatten visited Kashmir in June 1947 to persuade Maharaja Hari Singh to make a decision. Jammu and Kashmir expressed its intent to negotiate Standstill Agreements with both India and Pakistan. Pakistan signed the agreement but India delayed. However, faced with the tribal invasion, Maharaja Hari Singh executed the Instrument of Accession for Jammu and Kashmir on October 26, 1947. The Governor-General of India formally accepted this Instrument of Accession on October 27, 1947. A message from Nehru to Hari Singh on the evening of October 27 confirmed the receipt of the signed Instrument of Accession and Standstill Agreement. This action provided India with the legal basis to send troops into Kashmir (Menon, 1956; Zubrzycki, 2023).

Unlike many other princely states that fully merged with provinces or formed unions, Jammu and Kashmir acceded on specific terms and did not sign a merger agreement in the same manner as other states. Its relationship with the Government of India was initially confined to defence, external affairs, and communications, as stipulated in the Instrument of Accession. This unique status meant that Kashmir was not subject to the same comprehensive constitutional and financial integration as other Part B states, retaining its own internal customs duties and a distinct constitutional position (Menon, 1956; Zubrzycki, 2023).

The Government of India maintained that in cases of conflict between a ruler and the people over accession, the will of the people should prevail. Lord Mountbatten suggested a plebiscite under United Nations auspices, but Jinnah objected to a plebiscite while Indian troops were present and Sheikh Abdullah was in power. India refused to hold a plebiscite because Pakistan did not withdraw its forces, and India considered the accession legally valid due to the Maharaja's signature, the National Conference's support, and the Constituent Assembly's approval. The dispute was eventually referred to the United Nations, after which it became primarily the concern of India's External Affairs Ministry (Basu, 2020; Lumby, 1981; Menon, 1956; Zubrzycki, 2023).

The Government of India negotiated a Privy Purse settlement for the Maharaja, fixed at Rs. 10 lakh, but Sheikh Abdullah later refused to honour it. Consequently, the Government of India continued to pay the Privy Purse from its own funds. Jammu and Kashmir received grants from the Government of India, including a portion of the Maharaja's Privy Purse (Menon, 1956).

Jammu and Kashmir's integration differed significantly from other princely states: Clause 7 of the Instrument of Accession specified that the monarch would not be compelled to accept any future Constitution of India, and the Government of India could not unilaterally enlarge its jurisdiction beyond the three surrendered subjects. The provisional nature of the accession, with its ultimate determination by a plebiscite, was a rare concession not extended to other states. Although promised, the plebiscite was never held. Jammu and Kashmir was the only state that declared its intention to have its own Constitution, to be drafted by its own Constituent Assembly. This was formalized in the Maharaja's Proclamation of March 5, 1948. Article 370 restricted the Union Parliament's legislative power over the state to defense, external affairs, and communications. Any extension of other constitutional provisions required the concurrence of the state government, subject to ratification by the state's Constituent Assembly. The ‘temporary’ nature of this article meant that the power to finalize the constitutional relationship was vested in the state's Constituent Assembly, not that it could be unilaterally abrogated. Unlike other states, Jammu and Kashmir was not subjected to the general scheme of financial integration devised by the Krishnamachari Committee, and internal customs duties continued to be levied (Kumar, 2012; Menon, 1956; White Paper, 1950).

Over time, India's policies of ‘integration/assimilation’ were perceived as eroding Jammu and Kashmir’s special status and autonomy. The Union Parliament's legislative powers were extended significantly beyond the initial three subjects (defence, external affairs, communications), and provisions like Articles 352, 356, and 357 were applied to the state. Titles such as Sadr-i-Riyasat and Wazir-i-Ala were changed to Governor and Chief Minister, respectively (Constitution of India, 1950; Kumar, 2012).

References:

• Basu, N. (2020). VP Menon: The Unsung Architect of Modern India. Simon & Schuster India.

  
  

• Constitution of India. (1950, January 26). Government of India.

  
  

• Kumar, A. (Ed.). (2012). Rethinking State Politics in India (0 ed.). Routledge India. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203813997

  
  

• Lumby, E. W. R. (1981). The transfer of power in India, 1945-7. Hyperion Press.

  
  

• Memoranda on the Indian States. (1935). Manager of Publications.

  
  

• Menon, V. P. (1956). The Story of Integration of the Indian states. Orient Blackswan.

  
  

• Ramusack, B. N., & Johnson, G. (2004). The Indian Princes and their States. Cambridge university press.

  
  

• White Paper on Indian States. (1950). Ministry of States, Government of India. https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/White_Paper_on_Indian_States_(1950)

  
  

• Zubrzycki, J. (2023). Dethroned: Patel, Menon and the integration of Princely India. Juggernaut Books.