21 | Patiala and East Punjab State Union (PEPSU)

Made with NotebookLM

Also Listen in Kannada | Marathi | Hindi

Patiala and East Punjab States Union was a unique administrative unit formed during the integration process of princely states. It comprised six salute states – Patiala, Kapurthala, Jind, Nabha, Faridkot, and Malerkotla – along with two non-salute states, Nalagarh and Kalsia. Historically. Four of these states – Patiala, Nabha, Jind, and Faridkot – were Sikh states known as Phulkian States, originating from a common ancestor named Phul. These states had come under British protection through the Treaty of Amritsar in 1809, after being under the suzerainty of Maharajah Ranjit Singh. The Kapurthala rulers belonged to the Ahluwalia family, and the Malerkotla rulers were Sherwani Afghans (Menon, 1956; White Paper on Indian States, 1950).

Geographically, the states lay in three separate blocks. The main block, including Patiala, Nabha, Jind, Malerkotla, and Faridkot, was fairly compact and located in the heart of East Punjab. Kapurthala State consisted of enclaves within the Jullundur district, and outlying areas of Patiala, Jind, and Nabha were situated in the southern districts of East Punjab. Additionally, Patiala had islands of territory within what is now Himachal Pradesh. The total area covered by these states was 26,156 sq km, with a population of 34,24,060, which were predominantly Sikh (Menon, 1956; White Paper on Indian States, 1950).

There were several points of contention which required complex negotiations before these states could be merged together.

Strategic Importance and Defence: Given their proximity to the border, it was imperative that these states form a strong combination that was administratively efficient and financially stable from a defence perspective.

Sikh Politics: The Sikhs were widely dispersed across Punjab, constituting only about 15% of the population in undivided Punjab. Despite being a numerical minority, they had historically held considerable political influence in undivided Punjab. The announcement of partition left them bewildered, as they faced the prospect of losing their homes and many important shrines to Pakistan. It plaed a crucial role in shaping an autonomous political identity for the Sikh community. The Akalis, as the institutional-political arm of the Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee (SGPC), championed Punjab, Punjabi and Punjabiat and passed a resolution in March 1946, demanding a separate independent state for Sikhs (Jeffrey, 1978; Kumar, 2012; Menon, 1956).

The Maharaja of Patiala, Yadavindra Singh, and the Raja of Faridkot, Harinder Singh, were approached by Master Tara Singh to secure arms and soldiers for a plan to seize Punjab for themselves, though this uprising ultimately did not take place. Jinnah, too, attempted to persuade Sikh leaders to join the Muslim League. Leaders with pro-Akali sympathies, notably Giani Kartar Singh, sponsored a plan for merging the Punjab States with East Punjab. This Sikh politics at the time was in a state of flux, necessitating a Union of all Punjab States under the control of the Government of India to act as a stabilizing factor (Jeffrey, 1978; Kumar, 2012; Menon, 1956).

Viability of Smaller States: A Union of the East Punjab States without Patiala was not considered feasible due to a lack of resources and their scattered nature.

Alternatives to Union/Merger: Several alternatives were considered, including amalgamating Himachal Pradesh and the East Punjab States with East Punjab, or even including Patiala in such a merger. However, these were rejected. Himachal Pradesh was kept separate because it lacked the resources to be self-reliant and its people opposed merger with the plains on the grounds of cultural differences. Merging the main block of Punjab States with East Punjab was deemed impractical due to the strain the province was already under from partition-related events. It was decided to maintain East Punjab, Himachal Pradesh, and the East Punjab States as three separate administrative units (Menon, 1956).

Maharajah of Patiala's Role: V.P. Menon convinced the Maharajah of Patiala, Sir Yadavindra Singh, of the necessity of joining the Union. Menon frankly explained to him that Patiala could not exist independently. The Maharajah's earlier proposals for affiliation with smaller states or a federal union with the rest of Punjab States were not entertained, as the government was not prepared to perpetuate the separate existence of smaller states. Menon advised the Maharajah to emulate other viable rulers like Gwalior, Indore, and Rewa who had agreed to pool their sovereignties. The Maharajah ultimately accepted the principle of a Union of the Punjab States, including Patiala, recognizing it would satisfy the aspirations of reasonable elements in the Sikh community (Menon, 1956).

Hereditary Rajpramukhship: Patiala's advisers sought a hereditary Rajpramukhship for the Maharajah, but this was deemed impossible. As a compromise, the Maharajah requested a provision for votes proportional to population in the election of the Rajpramukh (Menon, 1956).

Political Groups' Positions: Before the covenant was signed, Giani Kartar Singh and Sardar Baldev Singh advocated for the merger of these eight states with East Punjab. Menon emphasized the State Ministry’s policy and the existing stress on East Punjab. The decision to form a separate entity for the Punjab States was applauded by both Nationalist Sikhs and Akali leaders, including Master Tara Singh and Giani Kartar Singh (Jeffrey, 1978; Menon, 1956).

Ministry Formation: The formation of a ministry was difficult due to the Prajamandal (the counterpart of the Congress organization in the provinces) being up against the Akali Dal, a communal body claiming to represent the majority of the Sikh community.

Finally, the covenant for its formation was signed by the rulers on May 5, 1948, and the Union was inaugurated on July 15, 1948, by Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel. The Maharajah of Patiala was designated as the first Rajpramukh for life, and the Maharajah of Kapurthala as the first Uprajpramukh for life. The unique feature of the agreement was that the Maharajah of Patiala would not exercise his votes in the election of the Uprajpramukh. The Council of Rulers, consisting of the rulers of the salute states and one ruler elected by the non-salute states, would elect the Rajpramukh and Uprajpramukh after the deaths of the current incumbents (White Paper, 1950).

Initially, the states had acceded to the Dominion of India on three subjects: defence, external affairs, and communications, without any other financial commitments. This limited relationship was seen as a tenuous but necessary step. With the formation of the Union, the principle of enlarging the scope of accession was applied. A provision was included in the PEPSU covenant, similar to that for Madhya Bharat, making it mandatory for the Rajpramukh to execute an Instrument of Accession acceding on all federal and concurrent subjects, excluding taxation and duties. This placed PEPSU in a position analogous to that of the provinces concerning central legislation (White Paper, 1950).

The Privy Purses were agreed upon as a quid pro quo for the rulers surrendering their powers and dissolving their states as separate units. For PEPSU, the total Privy Purse for all rulers amounted to Rs 33,24,600 annually. Patiala received the highest amount of Rs. 17 lakh per annum. This was one of the eleven cases where the Rs 10 lakh ceiling for Privy Purses was exceeded for viable states that were key to the integration policy. The Central Government eventually assumed liability for these payments. PEPSU gained from financial integration (where federal expenditure exceeded their revenue) and contributed these gains to meet Privy Purse payments (White Paper, 1950).

The covenant provided for a Constituent Assembly, though it was never convened. The Union functioned under a small council of ministers, effectively nominees of the Government of India. Initially, States Forces were excluded from the scope of 'defence' in the Instrument of Accession. However, with financial integration, the Central Government took over the liability for paying these forces, and they were completely absorbed into the Indian Army by April 1, 1951 (White Paper, 1950).

References:

• Jeffrey, R. (Ed.). (1978). People, princes and paramount power: Society and politics in the 

  Indian princely states. Oxford University Press.

  
  

• Kumar, A. (Ed.). (2012). Rethinking State Politics in India (0 ed.). Routledge India. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203813997

  
  

• Menon, V. P. (1956). The Story of Integration of the Indian states. Orient Blackswan.

  
  

• White Paper on Indian States. (1950). Ministry of States, Government of India. https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/White_Paper_on_Indian_States_(1950)

Annexure

PEPSU Covenant