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27 | Census under Pandemic and Protest: The 1921 Census of India

  • Mar 23
  • 22 min read

Updated: 3 days ago

By Gaurav Kalyani and Shivakumar Jolad

Published on: 7 August 2026



Introduction


On the night of 18 March 1921, enumerators across the Indian Empire went from door to door, verifying schedules that had already been written out weeks earlier, to record the population of a subcontinent still recovering from war, famine, and the deadliest epidemic of the century. The resulting report was compiled by Census Commissioner J. T. Marten of the Indian Civil Service. 


This essay is a deep dive into the report on how the influenza epidemic of 1918–19 and the non-cooperation movement of 1920–21 shaped both the population and the process of counting it, along with the detailed findings of the 1921 Census.


The Making of the Census: Logistics and Methods 


Marten inherited an organisational machine that had already run four times before and changed remarkably little of it. Continuity mattered more than novelty, since a census report's value lies partly in letting one decade be measured against the next. 


Where he departed from his predecessor Edward Gait, was chiefly in scope: he trimmed the descriptive, ethnographic material that had padded earlier reports, following a 1920 Government of India resolution which held that census officers should instead turn their attention to “statistical and general information bearing on the industrial and economic side of the life of the people.”


The enumeration machinery


The district remained the basic unit, subdivided into charges, circles and blocks, with a block usually thirty to forty houses. Enumerators were drawn chiefly from Land Record staff and village schoolmasters, under a statutory duty to serve. Census night was not the only occasion of counting, as a preliminary enumeration ran over the preceding three or four weeks, writing up schedules for each block.


The final compilation of returns total differed from the provisional figure by only 0.04 percent. Marten was candid that there is “no direct means of gauging the accuracy of the Indian census,” but assembled indirect evidence. Schedule entries were transcribed by copyists onto slips, which clerks then sorted by hand into the combinations required for each table, the same method used in 1911. Mechanical tabulation by electric sorting machines, then being introduced into large railway offices, was considered and set aside. Such machines had no track record under Indian conditions, so Marten left the decision for 1931 census. 


There was a notable rise in the administrative cost of the census, increasing from Rs. 5–6 per 1,000 individuals in 1911 to Rs. 14 per 1,000 in 1921. Expenditure varied significantly by region; while provinces like Bengal and Bihar and Orissa maintained lower costs between Rs. 9 and 11, others such as Burma and Baroda saw much higher rates of over Rs. 27 and Rs. 54 per 1,000, respectively. 


Despite these internal increases, the Indian census remained relatively low cost when compared to international benchmarks, such as the 1911 census of England and Wales, which cost approximately 81–82 rupees per 1,000 persons. 


Two Disruptions

 

No decade in the census's fifty-year run had been free of some special disaster, Marten noted, but 1911–1921 was dominated by an event without precedent in scale: an influenza pandemic that, in his words, “wiped out in a few months practically the whole natural increase in the population for the previous seven years.” Layered onto the final year of the count came a second, quite different disruption of the non-cooperation movement, which complicated recruitment of the unpaid staff on whom the whole enumeration depended.


The influenza epidemic of 1918–19


Influenza reached India in two waves. The first, radiating from Bombay around June 1918, was comparatively mild and struck urban populations hardest, particularly children and the elderly. The second wave, beginning in Poona district that September, was far more severe, typically raging eight to ten weeks per province. 


This time it was rural India, not the towns, that suffered the worst. Adults between twenty and forty were hit hardest, pregnant women especially so, with excess mortality in some age-groups reaching nearly four times the mean. The report noted the collapse in normal life in which “whole villages were absolutely laid desolate by the disease.” Crops left unharvested, and administration was paralysed as officials themselves fell ill. 


The report's own reckoning, drawn from the Sanitary Commissioner's returns, put recorded mortality in registered areas at about 7.1 million deaths in 1918 and 1.4 million in 1919, nearly 8.5 million across areas covering three-quarters of the population. Extended to unregistered areas where the epidemic was, if anything, especially virulent. 

The report arrived at a national estimate of 12 to 13 million deaths, exceeding by nearly two million the toll of twenty years of plague (1898–1918), and more than double the deaths from the famines of 1897–1901. 

At a case-mortality rate of roughly ten percent, some 125 million people or  about two-fifths of India were affected by the disease in some form.


The birth-rate fell below the death-rate in both 1918 and 1919, recovering only to a slight excess in 1920, and the report calculates that without the epidemic, the population enumerated in March 1921 would have been close to 39.5 million higher. This explains why the decade's overall growth rate fell to a fraction of what earlier decades had recorded.


The non-cooperation movement


(Non-cooperation movement, 1922. Source: Wikimedia Commons)
(Non-cooperation movement, 1922. Source: Wikimedia Commons)

The census depended on an army of unpaid local officials and volunteers such as supervisors, enumerators, village schoolmasters, land-record staff etc. performing extra duties for no reward beyond a certificate of service. This made it structurally vulnerable to exactly the civil disaffection that peaked in late 1920 and early 1921. Appendix I of the report collected candid extracts from the provincial reports on the attitude of the Public and the influence of Non-co-operation movement.


"The danger of the non-co-operation movement therefore lay not in active attempts to wreck the census, but in the indifference it encouraged in the staff."

-- Bihar and Orissa Report, Appendix I


This sentence captures the pattern reported almost everywhere. The outright sabotage was rare, but persuading people to serve unpaid, at an inconvenient moment, amid a nationalist call to withhold cooperation, became far harder. 


In Bombay, the movement combined with a strike among village accountants (Talatis) over pay to produce what the report calls “the two great obstacles” to enumeration. In the Central Provinces, Mahatma Gandhi held a public meeting in Nagpur at 11 p.m. on the census night itself, and the local report noted that “the rank and file of his followers were passively if not actively hostile.” 


In Bengal, resistance was concentrated, the report noted, among a few Marwaris and others who held the opinions of non-co-operators in Calcutta. In the United Provinces, non-cooperators refused both to serve as officials and, as heads of households, to supply information, although prosecution under the Census Act largely contained the latter.


However, Gandhi's own position was that opposition to the census was never part of the non-cooperation programme. He issued a public notice urging cooperation, but this, the Bihar and Orissa report observed, “was published too late to produce much effect” on staff already demoralised by weeks of recruitment difficulty. 


Mahatma Gandhi ultimately endorsed and lobbied for public cooperation with the 1921 census, viewing it as a means to strengthen the Indian national cause. Although he initially felt conflicted between his commitment to civil disobedience, he concluded that participation in the census provided valuable discipline in non-violent resistance. He explicitly urged his followers to resist the temptation to offer civil disobedience toward the census exercise (Times of India, 2011).


The judgement across the provincial extracts was consistent that the movement raised the cost of assembling reliable staff and delayed preparations considerably in some cities. Patna was singled out as the worst case, however Marten's considered view, after reviewing every provincial account, was that it did not compromise the accuracy of the final enumeration in any general sense. Where severe difficulties were noted, additional paid enumerators were engaged and blocks doubled up.


Impact of World War I


The demographic impact of the first world war, also referred to as the Great War, in the census was negligible as compared to the Spanish flu pandemic. The the total number of death casualties recorded among officers and ranks of Indian Army units and labor corps was 58,238. 


At the peak of the war (1914–1919), approximately 480,000 Indians were serving outside the country at one time, consisting of 250,000 troops and 230,000 members of the labor corps. By the time of the 1921 Census, many had returned, but the excess of emigration during the decade was partially balanced by these military movements. 


In the Punjab, some officials argued the war actually saved more lives than it cost. Because many recruits were kept in cantonments with efficient medical precautions, they were better protected from the 1918 influenza epidemic than they would have been in their home villages. 


The outbreak of war in 1914 led to an immediate decline in foreign trade due to the contraction of shipping. Massive demand for food, munitions, and war materials placed a severe strain on the railway organization and local distribution systems, causing prices for necessities like salt, oil, and cloth to rise sharply. 


The war disrupted social and religious institutions; for example, in Ranchi, German missionaries were interned in July 1915, and their stations were eventually transferred to other organizations or autonomous local control. The report also noted that the war so thoroughly altered the political map of Europe that contemporary readers might find it difficult to use European geography as a familiar point of comparison for Indian statistics. 


A major policy shift occurred in March 1917, when indentured labor emigration was officially stopped under the Defence of India Rules. The enforcement of these rules contributed to a broader shift in Indian migration patterns during the decade. There was a noticeable reduction of traditional outflow of laborers to foreign countries. This reduction in labor migration was largely balanced out by the high number of soldiers and students who left for foreign countries during the war years. By the time of the 1921 Census, approximately two million laborers had returned to India from the colonies during that decade.


Population: Scale, Growth and Density

The Indian Empire covered 1,805,332 square miles in 1921, about 61 percent (1,094,300 sq. miles) in directly administered British Territory, and the rest in the Indian States. Its enumerated population was 318,942,480. Of that, about 247 million (77 percent) were in British Territory and just under 72 million (23 percent) in the States. 


The report reached for scale comparisons common in its own time. India's area was about half that of the United States but carried nearly three times the population.


Table: Population, Area, and Density (Provinces and Princely States), 1921

Province, State, or Agency

Area (sq. miles)

Population (1921)

Mean Density per sq. mile (1921)

INDIA (Total)

1,805,332

318,942,480

177

Provinces (Total)

1,094,300

247,003,293

226

Ajmer-Merwara

2,711

495,271

183

Andamans and Nicobars

3,143

27,086

9

Assam

61,471

7,990,246

130

Baluchistan

134,638

799,625

6

Bengal

82,277

47,592,162

578

Bihar and Orissa

111,809

37,961,858

340

Bombay

187,074

26,757,648

143

Burma

233,707

13,212,192

57

Central Provinces and Berar

131,052

15,979,660

122

Coorg

1,582

163,838

104

Delhi

593

488,188

823

Madras

143,852

42,794,155

297

N.-W. Frontier Province

38,919

5,076,476

130

Punjab

136,905

25,101,060

183

United Provinces

112,244

46,510,668

414

States and Agencies (Total)

711,032

71,939,187

101

Baroda State

8,127

2,126,522

262

Central India (Agency)

51,531

5,997,023

116

Cochin State

1,479

979,080

662

Gwalior State

26,357

3,186,075

121

Hyderabad State

82,698

12,471,770

151

Kashmir State

84,258

3,320,518

39

Mysore State

29,475

5,978,892

203

Rajputana (Agency)

128,987

9,844,384

76

Sikkim State

2,818

81,721

29

Travancore State

7,625

4,006,062

525

A decade of arrested growth


The census recorded an increase of only 1.2 percent over the decade, a sharp deceleration against the average of 5.5 percent per decade maintained since 1872. The report was explicit about the cause: the influenza epidemic. Started in the latter part of 1918, it wiped out in a few months practically the whole natural increase in the population for the previous seven years.



Marten was wary of extrapolating too much from any single decade's growth rate. His predecessor's 1911 calculation, that India's population would double roughly every century and a half at the observed long-run rate, was notable but cannot be taken seriously, he noted. 


(Source: Marten, 1924)
(Source: Marten, 1924)

Only 1881–91 passed without major calamity and was usually treated as a period of fairly normal progress. With such shocks absent, he estimated a natural decadal increase of seven to eight percent might reasonably be expected. 


(Source: Marten, 1924)
(Source: Marten, 1924)

Density, and the limits of a simple average


The report warned against a naive reading of population density. Citing the economist A. L. Bowley, it observed that dividing population by area conceals two heterogeneous totals: one mixing workers, dependents, old and young and the other mixing fertile plain, barren mountain and forest. 


Density ranged from 721 persons per square mile in the Gangetic plain to single figures in Baluchistan and the Himalayan tracts. The report also engages the contemporary debate on Indian ‘over-population’, citing P. K. Wattal's pamphlet and the Census Superintendent of Burma's distinction between a static and a kinetic definition. The latter was closer to Malthus's own meaning of a population growing faster than the supply of food, clothing and shelter.



Households and the joint family


On persons per house, an imperfect proxy for family size, the report noted the general opinion of the Provincial Superintendents that the joint family system had not yet undergone any radical change in the rural tracts of the country. Although disruptive tendencies were visibly stronger among the “professional and educated classes” in towns, the report noted. A correspondent quoted from Assam captured this:


The causes of the break-up are bitter quarrels, inconvenience of living in the same compound, a wider outlook on life due to modern conditions and a desire to have a separate purse on the part of the younger members of the family.

— E. A. Lloyd, Assam Superintendent


In Bombay, a special analysis of household schedules found the modal household size to be four persons, though a tail of larger joint households pulled the mean up to five, varying directly with a family's economic position.

India in 1921 remained overwhelmingly rural. A town was defined, as in the two previous censuses, as any municipality, cantonment, civil lines area, or any “continuous collection of houses” of 5,000 or more persons that a provincial superintendent chose to treat as a town. 


Of the population for which urban data were tabulated, only 10.2 percent or  a little over 32 million people which were spread across 2,313 towns and cities, were classed as urban. The report clearly highlighted the comparison, noting, “as compared with 23 percent in the most urbanized unit of the Indian Empire [Bombay Presidency], the proportion of the population of England classed as urban is 79 percent, and of France 44 percent.”




One striking finding concerned the sex composition of India's largest commercial and industrial towns. Calcutta's population had males outnumbering females by distinctly over two to one, with only 374 married females per 1,000 married males. It reflected a predominance of male migrant labour which the report noted as “leading an unnatural existence, missing the comforts of home life.” 


Rangoon showed a similarly skewed ratio of 444 women per 1,000 men, against the resident Burmese town of Mandalay, which counted 915. This was the evidence that the imbalance was a function of migrant industrial labour rather than of urban life as such.


Table: FEMALES PER 1,000 MALES IN SELECTED CITIES, 1921

CITY

FEMALES PER 1,000 MALES

Calcutta

<500 (over 2:1 male excess)

Bombay

524

Rangoon

444

Karachi

629

Ahmedabad

763

Sholapur

894

Mandalay

915

 

By contrast, the average rural sex ratio in most provinces sat much closer to parity, underscoring that the imbalance was specific to industrial and commercial towns that drew in male labour from outside — jute mill hands in Bengal, dock workers, mill labour in Bombay — while their families remained in the village.


The contrast of Villages


The chapter on the rural and urban populations closes with a self-critical discussion of what a village even meant statistically. The term covered, province to province, anything from a genuine settlement to a purely administrative revenue unit with no relationship to where people live.

 

In Sind, one revenue village in the Karachi district covered 1,806 square miles and 3,572 occupied houses but was recorded as containing only two villages. In Bihar's Monghyr district, the size of a revenue village (mauza) ranged from under one acre to 72,000 acres. Marten concluded that “there is no single homogeneous unit which can be described as a village,” and that the cross-province comparisons of rural distribution on this basis were of limited value.

The 1921 census recorded birthplace by asking every person to name their district of birth and, if outside the province, their native province, state, or country. Only 603,526 persons were recorded as born outside India altogether. About four-fifths of them were from other Asian countries (Nepal, Afghanistan, China, Ceylon, Arabia chiefly), the rest mostly from Britain and Europe.

 

India, in turn, was estimated to send out roughly 1.7 million people to other countries. The international movement in either direction was practically negligible at India's scale.


Movement within India was similarly modest. About 30 million people or 10 percent of the population, were enumerated outside their district of birth, and of these some 20 million had moved no further than a neighbouring district. The report attributed this to “economic and social causes, and the immobility of an agricultural population rooted to the ground, fenced in by caste, language and social customs.”

90% of India's population in 1921 were enumerated in the very district where they were born. 

Five kinds of migration


The internal movement was organized into these five categories in the report:

 

  1. Casual movement between neighbouring villages (marriage, family, minor business), 

  2. Temporary labour migration to canals and railways, or pilgrimage and marriage travel, 

  3. Periodic migration tied to harvest labour, 

  4. Semi-permanent migration, where workers earned a living away from home while remitting earnings back, and 

  5. Permanent settlement migration, as in the Punjab canal colonies or Assam tea gardens. 


Marriage customs themselves generated much casual movement, since a bride often married outside her village and returned to her parents' home to give birth, so birthplace statistics for women partly reflect marriage patterns rather than economic migration.

Of all the categories in the schedule, age was treated with the most open scepticism about the numbers. Marten traced it to a general disinterest in exact age and a residual unease about disclosing it at all. Edye's account from the United Provinces is candid about this:


The ordinary educated Indian has very vague ideas about his own age. The uneducated Indian has practically no ideas at all... During the period when the staff was being trained, I had my own age guessed by hundreds of supervisors and enumerators, and the estimates were seldom within five years of the truth, and varied between 16 and 60.

— W. Edye, United Provinces Superintendent


This showed up statistically as heavy ‘digit preference’,clustering of reported ages on multiples of five and, especially, of ten. In a specially tabulated group of 100,000 males in Bihar and Orissa, about 25 percent of ages were recorded ending in 0, and a further 18 percent ending in 5. 


The census utilized corrective techniques, including an “Index of Concentration” borrowed from United States Census Bureau practice, to quantify and adjust for this rounding bias.


Infant mortality


The report situated Indian infant mortality within an international comparison where death rates for infants under one year had fallen steadily in most countries since 1881 — by 24.6 percent in France, 15.8 percent in England, as much as 37.6 percent in Australia. 


In British India, about one-fifth of children died before their first birthday, attributed to biological factors (age of the mother, spacing of pregnancies) and economic factors (poverty, sanitation, malnutrition). Rates were highest in the United Provinces and Central Provinces, lower in Madras. Bombay and Calcutta had distinctly high rates, though the report cautioned that defective birth-reporting in cities may exaggerate the apparent rate.


Sex Ratio



India's sex ratio stood at 955 in 1921, continuing a slow decline from 962 in 1901. Going against the prevalent theory, the report devoted much energy to rebutting a charge occasionally made by critics, that this male excess reflected systematic under-counting of women rather than a genuine demographic fact. 


Marten retorted that the shortfall does not appear preferentially among communities where women are secluded, and the ratio worsened, not improved, as enumeration grew more accurate over successive censuses,which is the opposite of what an under-counting theory would predict.



The report instead locates the cause in the differential treatment of the sexes across the life course, quoting at length from Sir Edward Gait's 1911 analysis:


In India... sons are earnestly longed for while daughters are not wanted... Sometimes the prejudice against daughters is so strong that abortion is resorted to when the midwife predicts the birth of a girl. Formerly female infants were frequently killed as soon as they were born, and even now they are very commonly neglected to a greater or less extent... To the evils of early child-bearing must be added unskilful midwifery; and the combined result is an excessive mortality amongst young mothers.

— Sir Edward Gait, Chapter VI












(Maps showing proportions of sexes, actual vs natural. Source: Marten, 1924)


Marten adds that nothing in the specific circumstances of 1921 explains the further fall in the female ratio during this decade; if anything, he treats the consistency of the decline as itself an argument against any theory of episodic under-recording, and as evidence of structural causes operating steadily across decades.

The census classified every person, whether infant, child, or grown up, into the categories of unmarried, married, or widowed . The report flagged a distortion built into these categories for Hindu and Jain communities, because of child marriage. Many recorded as married were still living in their parents' homes awaiting a second ceremony, typically at puberty, before actually taking up married life. 



A decade of rising marriage age


Despite this caveat, the chapter's most notable finding is that of a measurable shift toward later marriage. This direction was the same across nearly every province. In Bengal, the proportion of boys aged 10–15 left unmarried rose from 826 to 868 per thousand between 1891 and 1921, and for 15–20 from 594 to 665. Mr Thompson, the Bengal Superintendent, offered a balanced explanation:


This may have been due in part to the fact that the last few years were hard times, and the greater difficulty of scraping together the money necessary to be spent... may have caused some marriages to be postponed, but the tendency of public opinion to favour later marriages has been a very significant one.

— Mr Thompson, Bengal Superintendent, Chapter VII


The pattern varied by caste. In Bengal, the Brahman and Baidya castes led the trend, followed by the Bengali merchant (Nabasakh) class. The Chasi Kaibartta cultivating caste raised the marriage age for boys but continued to marry girls young. Darbhanga in Bihar remained the “home of infant marriage”, with 64 boys and 103 girls per 1,000 married between ages 0 and 5. In the United Provinces, Edye attributed postponement among higher castes not to any shortage of marriageable women but to the extended schooling that was delaying marriage.


State legislation and widowhood


Two princely states had legislated directly on the question of child marriage. Baroda's Infant Marriage Prevention Law of 1904 set minimum ages of twelve for girls and sixteen for boys, with a lower exception carved out for the Kadwa Kanbi community's mass marriage ceremonies. The report noted stricter enforcement this decade, with rising convictions. Mysore had comparable legislation. 


On widowhood, the influenza epidemic left a visible mark, because mortality struck married adults heavily without killing both spouses equally. It mechanically transferred many survivors into the widowed category.

The report acknowledges that the statistics on infirmities are among the most difficult to collect accurately due to factors such as imperfect diagnosis, unintentional omissions, and the intentional concealment of afflictions by families fearing social stigma. The total number of recorded infirm persons in India saw a continuous decline between 1881 and 1901, largely due to improved medical knowledge and actual decreases in prevalence (such as cataract cures for blindness). 


However, between 1911 and 1921, there was a slight increase in recorded cases, which administrators attributed to more thorough recording and tabulation rather than a rise in the conditions themselves. This decade was also marked by high mortality among the infirm during the 1918 influenza pandemic and subsequent famines, as these individuals often lacked the resources or physical strength to survive such crises. 


The report noted a much lower proportion of insanity in India compared to Europe, though it questions whether this reflects a true difference in "mental strain" or simply the difficulty of diagnosing mental derangements through a general census. Deaf-mutism was defined as a congenital defect. A change in the census instructions in 1921 which omitted the phrase ‘from birth’, led to the erroneous inclusion of some elderly people with senile deafness, which skewed the data for older age groups.


Blindness was the easiest infirmity to diagnose and carried the least social stigma, making its figures the most reliable. It observed that women suffered more frequently than men, a trend attributed to their prolonged exposure to smoky fires while cooking in ill-ventilated houses. 


Statistics for leprosy were considered heavily underestimated, with experts suggesting the actual number of cases could be five times higher than the census figures. The disease was frequently concealed due to shame, and its prevalence was often linked to hygienic conditions and specific regional environments, such as the Naga Hills or Burma. 


In almost all categories except blindness, males were recorded in significantly higher numbers than females. Marten concluded this was not a biological reality but rather evidence of systematic concealment of female afflictions within the household. 


An inquiry into the Punjab region specifically examined whether consanguineous marriages (common among some Muslim communities) led to higher rates of infirmities. The analysis provisionally concluded that there was no clear evidence that such marriages were more productive of insanity, blindness, or leprosy than the practices of the Hindu community

The 1921 Census of India marked a significant shift toward standardized measurement by utilizing the "write a letter to a friend and read the reply" test adopted in 1911. This allowed for a genuine comparison across the decade, revealing that overall literacy rose from 59 to 82 per 1,000 persons, a 39% increase. 


Beyond simple counting, the 1921 report introduced sophisticated analytical tools, such as "cost-per-literate" calculations in the United Provinces and demographic forecasting models in the Punjab to project future educational needs. Despite these administrative advancements, the data highlighted a stark reality that nine out of ten Indians remained entirely illiterate by the census’s exacting standard. 


Regional and social disparities remained remarkably durable throughout the decade.


Table 1: Literacy per 1,000 persons by age group and province/state, Census of India 1921

Province/State

All ages(M)

All ages(F)

5-10(M)

5-10(F)

15-20(M)

15-20(F)

20+(M)

20+(F)

India

139

21

29

10

174

36

171

20

Burma

510

112

96

45

569

156

620

118

Travancore

380

173

135

148

487

228

440

160

Cochin

317

115

69

45

359

174

397

113

Baroda

240

47

43

20

354

105

265

24

Bengal

181

21

45

11

214

28

225

21

Bombay

157

27

42

15

217

53

184

24

Madras

173

24

35

12

204

45

214

22

Mysore

143

22

35

12

174

43

169

19

Assam

124

14

35

8

164

23

150

13

Punjab with Delhi

76

9

9

3

98

17

97

10

United Provinces

73

7

14

3

92

12

89

7

Central Provinces & Berar

87

9

17

5

142

18

104

9

Bihar and Orissa

96

6

18

3

111

10

126

7

Rajputana and Ajmer

74

6

10

2

86

9

97

6

Hyderabad

57

8

16

5

86

14

67

8

Central India & Gwalior

65

7

14

4

78

11

83

7

Kashmir

46

3

7

1

53

4

61

2

Burma continued to lead the empire in literacy due to its traditional monastic schools, while the princely state of Kashmir remained at the bottom. The social hierarchy of literacy also persisted, with Zoroastrians (Parsis) maintaining a significant lead over other religious groups and scribal castes like the Baidya and Kayastha dominating the educational landscape. 


In contrast, depressed castes like the Chamar and Musahar were almost entirely excluded from literacy. Furthermore, urban environments provided a distinct advantage, as literate males were three times more common in cities than in rural areas, while literate females were six times more common. 


The gender gap remained one of the most prominent features of the census, with female literacy recorded at a minuscule 21 per 1,000. Although this represented a 71% proportional growth since 1911, the absolute numbers remained low due to entrenched social customs like purdah and early marriage, which frequently caused girls to be withdrawn from school prematurely. 


Officials also identified a "relapse into illiteracy," noting that many primary school students lost their reading and writing skills shortly after leaving school due to poor instruction and irregular attendance. This suggested that the state’s school enrolment figures often provided a misleadingly optimistic view of functional literacy. 


The 1918 influenza epidemic hit the illiterate rural poor harder than the wealthier literate classes, therefore its selective mortality may have artificially inflated literacy gains in some provinces. The 1921 report captured a colonial society at the very beginning of a mass education transition.

The 1921 Census of India’s approach to language was heavily shaped by the Linguistic Survey of India, marking a transition from pioneering discovery to the classification of data based on established scholarly schemes. Marten acknowledged significant practical difficulties in collecting accurate linguistic returns, noting that widespread bilingualism and a lack of technical knowledge among both respondents and enumerators often clouded the data. 


Because the public was generally unaware of scholastic distinctions between dialects, minor changes in census instructions could cause dramatic fluctuations in statistics; for instance, the recorded number of Dogri speakers was nearly halved when a specific instruction was omitted in 1921. Consequently, Marten cautioned that these figures should be viewed as general indicators of linguistic distribution rather than precise scientific measurements. 


Despite these administrative challenges, the census categorized approximately 316 million speakers into a handful of major language families. The Indo-Aryan family, comprising tongues of the northern and central plains like Hindi and Bengali, accounted for roughly three-quarters of the population with 232.5 million speakers. 



The Dravidian family followed as a massive second group with 64.1 million speakers, led by Telugu, which was the largest single Dravidian language.



The census also tracked smaller families along the subcontinent's fringes, including the Tibeto-Chinese (12.9 million), Austric (4.5 million), and Karen (1.1 million) families, which represented the diverse linguistic frontier of the empire. While the census documented a vast number of tribal and minor languages, many of these remained difficult to capture accurately due to the instability of local returns.

Religion was recorded from a simple instruction to enumerators: enter whatever religion each person returned, with tribal names recorded for those following none of the recognised faiths. Marten used this chapter to make a broader point about what such a return can and cannot mean. He observed, for most people, religion in the census sense was not a matter of doctrine but of communal identity; “that particular outlook and attitude towards the universe and his fellowmen which forms the tradition of his family and his clan.”

 

Of the population recorded, only about 850 individuals returned anything resembling agnostic, atheist or freethinker, not because personal doubt was rare, but because the census didn’t about personal beliefs.




Tribal Religions


One of the more self-critical commentaries in the report concerned what earlier censuses had labelled “Animism.” Marten renamed the category  as “Tribal Religions,” arguing that “Animism” implied a belief system the return never actually captured, and that the figures were of doubtful statistical value regardless. 


Their classification depended almost entirely on an enumerator's impression of whether a person of ambiguous identity should be recorded as Hindu or under their tribal name. Mr Sedgwick of Bombay put it bluntly: “our returns of Animists are absolutely worthless. They represent nothing and are entirely a matter of chance.” Marten retained the category chiefly to mark a population that definitely stood outside the circle of any of the main Indian religions. However he also conceded that its precise size was not reliable.


Hindu and Muslim population trends


The Muslim population grew by 3.1 percent over the decade against a slightly declining Hindu figure. This difference was attributed not to conversion, said to be by this period negligible, but to social custom. Islamic practice placed fewer restrictions on the remarriage of widows, and early marriage, while still common, was not so common as among Hindus, Marten noted. 


The Superintendent of Kashmir makes a related point, contrasting a Balti Muslim community practicing polygamy with Buddhist neighbours who shared wives among brothers to keep family estates intact. This illustrated how religious doctrine on marriage could shape a community's demographic and economic trajectory alike.


Note on other findings


The 1921 report gives an extensive and insightful commentary on the other important categories of Caste, Race & Tribe and Occupations. These are explored in depth in the separate  forthcoming articles in the Censusnama series.



Closing Observations


Ultimately, the 1921 Census report serves as a testament to administrative capability during a decade defined by the dual pressures of the deadliest influenza pandemic of the century. While the epidemic wiped out nearly all natural population increase and the political climate strained the recruitment of unpaid staff, the census successfully documented a subcontinent at a demographic and social crossroads.


What stands out, a century later, is what Marten himself seems proud of: a count of nearly 319 million people, whose provisional and final totals differed by 0.04 percent achieved not through technological advantage, but through an enormous, largely unpaid, chain of local cooperation.




(Authors: Gaurav Kalyani works as Research Associate at the Center for Legislative Education and Research, FLAME University, Pune; 

Dr. Shivakumar Jolad works as Associate Professor (Public Policy), and is the Chair of Center for Legislative Education and Research and Director India State Stories, FLAME University, Pune


Gaurav contributed to conceptualization, research, primary writing and editing;  Shivakumar contributed to conceptualization, research and visualizations)




Source:


Marten, J. T. (1924). Census of India, 1921, Volume 1, India, Part 1 - Report. Superintendent Government Printing. Calcutta. 



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