10 | Baroda State

Baroda was a substantial princely state with an area of 8,236 square miles and a population of approximately 3 million, generating an average annual revenue of about Rs 7 crore. Historically, it was known for its progressive administration under rulers like Sir Sayaji Rao, who initiated reforms such as compulsory and free primary education (introduced in 1893 and made universal by 1906). Some of his financial reforms include the abolition of transit duties (1887), and the discontinuance of most customs duties (1909) and withdrawal of its local "Babashahi" currency in favor of British Indian silver coinage in 1901. Baroda state encouraged commercial enterprise, establishing institutions like Bank of Baroda in 1901. In agriculture, it implemented experimental farming techniques and cooperative credit societies. Furthermore, Sayaji Rao also significantly developed the railway network in Baroda, with the state owning over 700 miles of open lines (White Paper, 1950).

Geographically, Baroda was unique in that its territories were not contiguous but rather interspersed with Bombay Province and other Gujarat states, including parts of the Kathiawar peninsula. Although the state had a long tradition of efficient administration, this heterogeneous nature posed administrative difficulties.

In the broader context of Indian State’s integration, when the British Crown was deciding to hand over the power to the new Indian Union, the paramountcy over princely states was set to lapse. This necessitated princely states to make new political arrangements with this successor government. Indian National Congress, since 1938, aimed to integrate the states into the Indian Union for political homogeneity. Baroda was among the first states to send representatives to the Constituent Assembly in 1947 and agreed to sign the Instrument of Accession. Shortly before the transfer of power, it acceded on the three subjects of defence, external affairs, and communications.

Despite this initial cooperation, the ruler, Sir Pratap Singh, later began to bargain for his position. In September 1947, during the Junagadh crisis, he displayed ‘staggering delusions,’ offering to help maintain peace in the Western Indian States if India granted him responsibility over all of them, including Gujarat states. He also expected to be crowned King of Gujarat for this responsibility (Zubrzycki, 2023).

He assured V. P. Menon and Sardar Patel that he would remain a ‘faithful ally’ of India. Patel sharply rejected his ambition, which aimed for a status similar to the Nizam of Hyderabad. Later when Pratap Singh realized that this put him in an unfavorable position with the Indian Government, he put the blame on his Diwan B. L. Mittal, who however denied he had anything to do with it (Basu, 2020).

Internally, Baroda was also facing a growing popular movement for responsible government, which gained momentum in January 1948, partly influenced by the formation of the Saurashtra Union. Sir Pratap Singh's relationship with his newly formed popular ministry was strained, as he complained of lack of consultation on administrative matters. V. P. Menon, the secretary of the States Ministry, approached Sir Pratap Singh, arguing that granting responsible government had reduced him to a constitutional head. Menon emphasized that Baroda's geographically scattered territory, intermingled with Gujarat and Kathiawar, made it vulnerable to linguistic rivalries, which could destabilize his position, especially given that the Maharaja was a Maratha while the majority of his subjects were Gujaratis. Menon advised merger with Bombay Province, assuring that the Government of India would safeguard the Maharaja's Privy Purse, privileges, and position (Menon, 1956). 

Sir Pratap Singh initially hesitated and consulted his Maharani, Shanta Devi, who opposed the merger but ultimately allowed him to make his own decision. He was eventually convinced that he would not receive fair treatment from his own ministry and that his future lay with the Government of India. The formal decision was endorsed by his Executive Council on January 28, 1949, and announced via press communiqué on January 31, 1949. After signing the agreement Pratap Singh was overcome with emotion and broke down in front of Menon, who assured him that he would do his best to get him a best possible deal regarding his Privy Purse, his personal privileges and properties (Menon, 1956).

The Key issues negotiated in the merger agreement were:

Privy Purse amount: This was a significant point which was discussed. While the Eastern States formula typically set a maximum of Rs 10 lakh, Baroda being a viable and key state, received a higher amount. Pratap Singh's Privy Purse was fixed at Rs 26.5 lakh annually. This amount was explicitly guaranteed by the Centre. It was the second largest amount after the Nizam of Hyderabad.

Private Property: Pratap Singh agreed to demarcate his private properties from state properties. He committed to setting apart the corpus of two state trusts, each worth Rs 1 crore, for public utility and education (which his predecessor had announced). He also promised to return some money he had taken, ensured Jawaharkhana records would be updated, agreed to compile separate lists of private and state jewels, and committed to bringing back pearl and diamond necklaces and other jewels he had taken to England. Furthermore, he agreed to create a trust of all his personal property, for the benefit of the Maharani and their children. These matters were settled amicably without arbitration.

Supersession of Previous Agreements: The merger agreement explicitly superseded the earlier Instrument of Accession (signed in August 1947, which established a limited constitutional relationship) and the Standstill Agreement. This meant that the Dominion Government gained "full and exclusive jurisdiction and power" over the state, making the prior limited accession obsolete.

Protection of State Servants: The agreement stipulated that, except with prior sanction from the Government of India, no civil or criminal proceedings could be instituted against any person for acts done in the execution of their duties as a servant of the State before the date of transfer of administration.

The Baroda Merger Agreement was formally signed on March 21, 1949, by Pratap Singh Gaekwar and V.P. Menon, with the administration of the State to be transferred to the Dominion Government on May 1, 1949. The core features of the agreement, which was largely identical in terms to those signed by other merged states, were:

• Cession of Authority: The Maharaj ceded full and exclusive authority, jurisdiction and powers for and in relation to the governance of the State to the Union Government. This effectively transferred all ruling powers to the Government of India.

• Guaranteed Rights and Privileges: The agreement guaranteed the Maharaja's personal rights, privileges, immunities, and dignities

• Integration of Administration: The agreement provided for the complete integration of the state's administration with that of Bombay Province

• Financial Integration: The Indian States Finances Enquiry Committee was tasked with examining the financial problems arising from Baroda's merger with Bombay. The agreement laid the groundwork for the financial integration where the Central Government took over central subjects and assets/liabilities, while the provincial government took over provincial ones. The liability for the Privy Purse would eventually be transferred to the central budget.

• Standstill Arrangements: While the merger agreement superseded earlier standstill agreements, the original intention of standstill agreements was to avoid administrative vacuums and ensure continuity of arrangements between the Crown and States in matters of common concern, like customs, salt, opium, excise, posts, telegraphs, during the transition.

Following the merger, Sir Pratap Singh later challenged the validity of the process, claiming it was without his concurrence and that the subsequent developments were unwarranted. V.P. Menon strongly refuted these claims, citing the Maharaja's own written agreement, his Executive Council's resolution, and his public press communiqué as evidence of his deliberate decision. Menon emphasized that such significant political changes were driven by the ‘dynamic urges of the times’ and that the integration of Indian states was an inevitable outcome in a democratic and free India. Despite the initial guarantees, Sir Pratap Singh continued to be a controversial figure. In 1950, he became a leading spirit among rulers forming an ‘association of rulers’ to air grievances to the States Ministry. Subsequently, in April 1951, the Government of India deprived him of his titles, privileges, and dignities in favor of his eldest son. This action underscored the Centre's determination to ensure full integration and limit any lingering princely power (Menon, 1956).

References:

• Basu, N. (2020). VP Menon: The Unsung Architect of Modern India. Simon & Schuster India.

  
  

• Menon, V. P. (1956). The Story of Integration of the Indian states. Orient Blackswan.

  
  

• Ministry of States. (1950). White Paper on Indian States. Government of India. 

  
  

• Zubrzycki, J. (2023). Dethroned: Patel, Menon and the integration of Princely India. Juggernaut Books.